Malapportionment of state legislatures before the mid-1960s gave urban and surburban voters much less representation than they deserved. This paper documents that suburban and urban voters had markedly different policy preferences, party identifications, and partisan voting behavior than rural areas, which were overrepresented. However, the patterns are not uniform. In the Northeast and North Central, the suburban and urban under represented areas were much more Democratic than rural areas. In the South and the West, the rural areas leaned more Democratic than the urban and suburban voters. Policy preferences split differently in the Northeast and North Central than they did in the South and West. Urban and Suburban voters were much more liberal on social welfare and economic policy than rural voters in those areas. In the South and West, few differences existed across locales. On only one issue did the urban and suburban areas have more liberal attitudes throughout the nation: racial politics. Court-ordered reapportionment, thus, increased the political weight of liberals and Democrats in the Northeast and North Central, but not in the South and West. Consistent with Erickson (1973), reapportionment moved the median voter in all regions to the left on issues of civil rights and racial policy.
Introduction
Reapportionment of state legislatures during the 1960s radically altered representation in the United States. Throughout the first half of the Twentieth Century, most state legislatures either required representation of area as well as people or neglected to draw new district boundaries, despite state constitutional requirements for population based representation. As a result representation in state legislatures failed to reflect much of the growth in urban and suburban areas that occurred during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. By 1960, dramatic differences in existed in at least one chamber of almost all state legislatures. In California, for example, Los Angeles county had one state senate seat for its 6 million people and the three smallest counties in the state, with combined population of 17,000 people, shared a senator. In Connecticut, the City of Hartford had two state representatives for its 180,000 residents, while Hebron also had two representatives for its 1,800 residents. Through a series of signficant court cases, beginning with Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court forced the states to eliminated these disparaties by the end of the 1960s. The sudden decline in rural political power in state legislatures had broad effects on public policies. Equalization of representation altered the distribution of public spending across areas within the states. Over-represented areas had long gained a disproportionate share of public expenditures because of their advantaged political positions. That vanished once representation was equalized (Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002) . It was natural to believe that the "liberal urban agenda" would succeed in other policy matters as well. Surprisingly, a broad shift in public policy in the states cannot be traced to reapportionment. Dye (1965) , Frederickson and Cho (1970) , and Jacob (1964) , however, find no or little evidence that malapportionment affected the overall liberalness of state policy, including overall levels of expenditure and labor regulation.
The exception is civil rights legislation. Erikson (1973) documents increased support for civil rights in state legislatures as a result of reapportionment.
In this paper, we examine the effects of reapportionment on the political parties. At the time, it was conjectured that Democrats and liberals would see the greatest political gains, because urban areas tend to be the most Democratic and usually had the least state legislative representation.
Democratic, labor and liberal political organizations provided much of the political activism in support of reapportionment. Erickson (1971) examines the effects of malapportionment on party control of non-southern state legislatures that were substantially malapportioned. In general, he concludes, Democrats tended to gain; however, only half of the chambers analyzed showed substantively large effects and some states saw significant Republican gains. (See also Roebeck 1972.) Subsequent studies have found similarly small net gains of the Democrats in the wake of reapportionment. Across the nation, Democrats seemed to have gained about 10 percent more state legislative seats (Egan, Kousser, and Persily 2002) . The lack of party effects has been a cause of some debate, with partisan gerrymandering often blamed for the weak Democratic gains (Cox and Katz 2001; Egan, Kousser and Persily 2002) .
Two puzzles emerge from past research. First, why did the Democrats make only modest gains following Baker, given the enormous under representation of cities? Second, why are the policy effects of reapportionment limited to civil rights and the distribution of public expenditures? Uneven policy changes and weak Democratic gains reflected, we believe, the nature of malapportionment throughout the country prior to Baker v. Carr. While partisan gerrymandering and related monkey business probably contributed some, much of the pattern of policy shift and partisan shift can be understood in terms of three factors: who was underrepresented, where, and what did they believe.
To answer these questions we examine the contours of electoral behavior and of citizens' policy attitudes across the regions and parties in the decades leading up to the implementation of the one-person, one-vote standard. We examine aggregate data on state election returns and the structure of legislative districts to measure the partisan effects of malapportionment. We examine the National Election Surveys from 1952 to 1968 to map the policy preferences of urban, suburban, and rural voters living in different regions.
There was not one realignment revolution, but many. Malapportionment in the state legislatures regularly followed the contours of population, with rural areas having disproportionately more state legislative representation. However, the partisanship and political orientations of rural, suburban, and urban communities varies across states and regions.
We discern four distinct regional patterns of partisan under-representation that are attributable to malapportionment. In the South, malapporitonment advantaged the Democrats, because rural areas voted much more Democratic than the cities. In the Northeast and North Central, malapportionment tended to advantage Republicans, because rural areas in these regions voted heavily Republican while the cities voted Democratic. In the West, a more mixed picture emerges, and the differences between urban and rural are less pronounced than in other regions.
Political orientations and policy preferences also varied across regions and locales. Southern rural voters, who were over represented throughout the South, tended to be very conservative;
Northern urban voters, who were under represented in their regions, tended to be very liberal.
The differences between these two sorts of voters are well known, but not exactly relevant.
The more meaningful comparison is within region. How did these voters compare to other partisans across geographic locales within their respective regions? Were urban and suburban Southerners, for example, more liberal thant rural Southerners? Such would have to be the case for reapportionment to affect public policy by realigning the electorate represented in the state legislatures.
Some important differences did exist; however, the patterns are such that the policy implications of reapportionment varied across regions and across areas of public policy. Both within the parties and in the electorate as a whole different political geography correlated differently with ideological belief and policy liberalism across regions. In the Northeast and North Central, reapportionment had the greatest potential to shift policy to the left; in the West, there was no such potential.
The potential to shift policy, we document, came from two engines. Fist, reapportionment had the potential to shift the median voter in the state legislative electorate as a whole. The average voter in many regions was much more liberal than the over represented rural voter.
Second, reapportionment had the potential to move the political parties. Urban and rural voters within the Democratic party differed substantially on most issues of the day. The Republicans were not similarly split. Reapportionment in the mid-1960s likely fueled the divisions within the Democratic party -divisions over race, labor relations, education and economic policy that events and organizations were pushing to the fore of the national political agenda.
In the pages that follow we document these patterns using a mix of aggregate and survey data.
Our goal is less to estimate the effects on specific policy changes and more to document the patterns of malapportionment as they relate to the representation of political preferences. Ultimately, we argue that reapportionment produced four different regional patterns of partisan realignment.
In the Northeast and North Central, reapportionment shifted politics toward Democrats and the left. In the South, reapportionment shifted politics toward the Republicans, but not assuredly to the right and on issues of race the shift was in the liberal direction. In the West, reapportionment had little immediate partisan and ideological impact.
Representation and Partisanship
How did inequalities of representation relate to partisanship?
Malapportionment produced partisan advantages to the extent that rural and urban areas within states and regions had differing party attachments. By far the most important factor explaining malapportionment was population. Rapid urban population growth created a rural backlash in the early 20th Century that produced constitutional and legal measures designed to guarantee over representation of rural interests. Typically states adopted rules that gave each county at least one seat in each chamber. Malapportionment, then, advantaged partisans in rural areas, whatever their political leaning. (See McKay 19xx, Dixon 19xx, and Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Woon 1999.) State legislatures and constitutional conventions sometimes magnified these advantages further through gerrymandering that gave the minority party especially few seats.
New York state is a case in point. In 1894, New York convened a constitutional convention to revise its constitution. The convention was dominated by Republicans and wrote into the new constitution boundaries for the new legislative districts. A coalition of outstate Republicans from rural and urban areas (especially Buffalo) and rural Democrats allotted New York City many fewer seats that it deserved. Republicans from New York City went along with the plan, which was approved in a straight party vote, because the plan strengthened the party in the state legislature. The plan also Gerrymandered the city to create some Republican seats, one of which was seat four city blocks wide and 80 long. 
RRI.
The Relative Representation Index is highly skewed. To reduce the skew we convert this index to the logarithmic scale, which implies that "fair" representation has logarithm of RRI of 0. The Logarithm of RRI has a mean of .31 and variance of .58 for state representative elections, and a mean of .29 and a variance of .58 for state senate elections.
We construct a similar measure of the propensity of a county to vote Democratic. The average Democratic share of the two-party vote in the county over the past 2 elections for President, US Senate, and governor. We calculate the Relative Democratic Vote of the county as the average To make the NES party identification measure comparable over time detrended and standardized the traditional 7-point measure. Our measure has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 100. A partisanship score of 50, for example, means that an the partisanship of an area is one-half of one standard deviation above the overall mean of the item (in a given year throughout the nation). The standardized party identification measure for each type of locality and each region are shown in Table 1 . Within each region party identifications differed significantly across locales.
[ Table 1 
Divisions Within The Parties
Reapportionment divided the parties as much as it improved their electoral position vis-a-vis their opponents.
Tennessee provides a telling pattern. In 1962, when the Court decided the case, Tennessee had not reapportioned since 1901. Population growth in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville and Chattanooga meant that these cities had fewer legislative seats than they deserved. In addition, the rural eastern parts of the state, which had strong Republican allegiance since the Civial War, were also under represented. The central and western rural counties held the majority of seats, though they did not have a majority of the population. These counties voted overwhelmingly Democratic, and they dominated the state legislature. While Republican areas picked up some seats from these areas, the Democratic cities -Nashville and Memphis -gained even more. By the 1970s, the cities had become much more numerous within the Democratic party in Tennessee. We examined survey responses to the National Election Survey to a range of questions concerning ideology and public policy from 1952 to 1968. The issues included Social Welfare, Government Guaranteed Jobs, Labor Unions, Health Care, Aid to Schools, Regulation of the Economy, Segregation, Civil Rights, and Religion. As with the party identification measures, we standardized each measure, i.e., we subtracted the mean and divided by the standard error. The parties showed markedly different patterns.
Consider, first, the Democrats. Table 2 presents the attitudes expressed by self-identified Democrats within each of the four regions and across localities on a range of domestic policy issues as well as general ideology. We denote in bold any questions that differ significantly across localities within a region.
The first row of Table 2 
Looking at specific questions of domestic policy reveals a deep split between Urban and Rural
Democrats throughout the country. On a range of economic and social welfare policies, Urban Democrats were substantially more liberal than there rural and suburban counterparts within their own party. These differences were most pronounced in the Northeast and North Central. To the extent that the Democratic party reflected the preferences of its voters, reapportionment likely moved the Democrats to the left on social welfare and other domestic, especially in the Northeast and North Central. In the West, Urban and Rural Democrats showed no significant divisions or differences on social and economic policies.
The great divide within the Democratic party came over racial politics -school integration, desegregation, and civil rights. In all regions, Urban Democrats were substantially more liberal than Rural and Suburban Democrats. The division was deepest in the South, where the difference between Urban and Rural Democrats on support for civil rights legislation, school integration, and general desegregation was greatest. Battles over these issues arose long-before Baker, but, at least within the Democratic party, reapportionment shifted political weight in the liberal direction at the time that implementation of integrationist policies was truly taking hold. (See Rosenberg xxxx on the timing of integration.)
In stark contrast to the Democrats, urban, sburban, and rural Republicans within each of the regions divided over few issues. Table 3 parallels Table 2 , but the subset of respondents consists of Republican party identifiers. Very few issues produced statistically significant differences between the over represented rural areas and the under represented suburban and urban areas among Republican voters. In the West and North Central, only four out of 38 questions showed statistically significant differences across locales. To the extent that geography correlated with policy preference, those differences appeared in the South and Northeast.
Like their Democratic counterparts, urban and suburban Republicans in the Northeast were, on the whole more liberal than their rural Republicans within the Northeast. Urban Republicans in the Northeast gave relatively liberal answers on questions about health care, school aid, government guaranteed jobs, school integration, and religion. Indeed, these Republicans offered policy opinions that were more liberal than the nation as a whole, though they considered them- Comparing the two major parties, it is evident that malapportionment affected the composition of the two major parties differently. Underrepresentation of urban areas lessened the political weight of urban, more liberal Democrats in all regions of the country, except perhaps the West.
Locale had less clear relationship to the policy preferences of Republican identifiers. There is almost no association between geography and ideology among western and midwestern Republicans.
In the South, urban Republicans, who tended to be underrepresented, were more conservative than rural Republicans, and in the Northeast urban Republicans tended to be somewhat more liberal than rural and suburban Republicans.
Ideological Divisions
The internal party divisions provide part of the answer to one of the puzzles with which we began: why was there little policy change? The parties are important in organizing legislatures.
Because the parties were affected differently in the different regions, any ideological shift was at best uneven. How did these internal party divisions net out in the electorate as a whole? Table 4 parallels Tables 2 and 3 As with the internal politics of the parties, the urban and rural areas of teh West differed little.
The only consistent and signficant differences within this region appear on the issues of school segregation and civil rights. Urban voters in the West were much more liberal than suburban and rural voters on this issue.
The Southern electorate showed a somewhat different pattern. On general ideology, the differences were slight, but rural southerners did tend to express a slightly more conservative overall identity. On moral and social issues, the South on the whole paralleled the Northeast and North Central. Though not as liberal as the nation as a whole, urban and suburban areas were much more liberal than rural Southerners in their attitudes on school integration, desegregation, and civil rights. Urban and suburban southerners also expressed more liberal opinions about religion in schools and the truth of the bible than their rural counterparts. However, on domestic economic policies and social welfare, urban and rural Southerners cannot be said to have differed consistently. On some questions, such as health care and economic regulation, rural Southerners expressed more liberal attitudes. On government guaranteed jobs, urban southerners were more liberal. And, suburban southerners often expressed the most conservative views within their region on social welfare and economic policy.
Discussion
The answers to our two puzzles are, we hope, now evident.
The expectation that Democrats would gain everywhere was based on the false premise that the Democrats resided in the cities and the Republicans in small towns and farms. The party splits varied across regions. In the South, rural areas were relatively more Democratic than urban areas; hence, malapportionment gave Democrats more representation than they deserved. In the Northeast and North Central, Republicans received greater weight than their numbers justified.
Within regions the partisan differences across locales were massive, but averaged across the country the seem modest.
Did reapportionment lead to partisan realignments within the regions? The answer is clearly yes. Erickson's (1971) These new urban Democratic districts, the NES data reveal, were much more liberal than the rural Democratic seats on civil rights, school aid, government jobs, health care, labor relations, and, in the Northeast and North Central, religion. As the party moved left, it lost many of its rural conservative adherents. As the parties realigned in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the urban centers emerged as the new core of the Democratic electorate. Sample includes all respondents who identify themselves as strong or weak Democrats.
Entries give expected score on item, where all items have been normalized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 100 and de-trended. So, e.g. a score of 50 means 1/2 of one standard deviation above the overall mean on the item. Higher scores denote more "liberal" position on the item.
Bold items are for cases where the F-test of the hypothesis of no-difference between urban, suburban and rural respondents is rejected at the .05 level. Sample includes all respondents who identify themselves as strong or weak Republicans.
Bold items are for cases where the F-test of the hypothesis of no-difference between urban, suburban and rural respondents is rejected at the .05 level. Entries give expected score on item, where all items have been normalized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 100 and de-trended. So, e.g. a score of 50 means 1/2 of one standard deviation above the overall mean on the item. Higher scores denote more "liberal" position on the item.
Bold items are for cases where the F-test of the hypothesis of no-difference between urban, suburban and rural respondents is rejected at the .05 level.
